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Abstract
The continuous balancing of the risks and benefits of exploiting known options or exploring new opportunities is essential
to human life. We forage for new opportunities when they are deemed to be more attractive than the available option, but
this decision to forage also entails costs. People differ in their propensity to exploit or forage, and both the social
circumstances and our individual value orientations are likely influences. Here, participants made foraging decisions for
themselves and for a charity of their choice in two paradigms: one that features two distinct modes of decision-making
(foraging vs classical economic decision-making) and one which is more directly related to the classical animal foraging and
ethology literature. Across both paradigms, individuals who possessed a stronger self-focused value orientation obtained
more rewards when they were allowed to forage for themselves rather than the charity. Neuroimaging during the tasks
revealed that this effect was associated with activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) in that more self-focused
individuals showed lower activity in dACC for the self-condition relative to the other condition. This evidence reveals a
dynamic interplay between foraging outcomes and the higher-order value system of individuals.
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Introduction
Many life decisions can be conceptualised as foraging problems
(Charnov, 1976; Constantino and Daw, 2015) where the choice is
between the exploitation of certain options and the exploration
of less certain ones. Employment decisions, mate selection and
internet searches are just a few scenarios wherein people must
choose whether to engage with the currently available options
or to search for alternative ones. To solve this type of problem,
an ideal forager compares the value of two strategies—engaging
with the currently available option or foregoing it to search
for alternatives—and chooses the one with the highest value.
The optimal solution (Marginal Value Theorem, Charnov, 1976)
to the foraging problem requires comparing the value of the
current option to the overall value of the alternative, foraging
environment.
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However, maximising personal gain is not the only determi-
nant for value decisions. Humans and other social animals often
forage on behalf of conspecifics. It is thus likely that foraging
decisions will be influenced by an individual’s social learning
history and social disposition. We present the first study to
contrast personal and social foraging in order to examine their
potential behavioural and neural differences. How much we
value another’s welfare may crucially influence foraging deci-
sions within the human social environment, but research has
not studied whether foraging for others involves substantively
different processes from foraging for oneself.
Outside of the foraging context, several studies have inves-
tigated behavioural differences between self vs other scenarios.
In the context of moral decision-making, Crockett et al. (2014)
contrasted how much money people will sacrifice to reduce the
number of painful electric shocks delivered to either themselves
or to an anonymous stranger. Results indicated that people
sacrifice more money to reduce a stranger’s pain than their own.
Mengarelli et al. (2014) contrasted monetary risk preferences
involving individuals’ own money or another person’s money
and found reduced loss aversion bias when the choices involved
another person’s money. In the context of perception and atten-
tion (see Sui and Gu, 2017, for a review), when participants were
asked to make a classification of faces as self, friend or stranger,
Keyes (2012) found that classification of self-faces was faster
than classifying faces of other people. Moreover, an enhanced
attention marker (N1) and a reduced decision-making marker
(P3) was observed for own compared to others’ faces in a study
examining the effects of facial cues on the orienting of visual
attention with event-related potentials (Liu et al., 2015).
Moreover, a number of studies have investigated self vs other
differences using neuroimaging. In particular, several studies
have examined the neural basis of charitable decision-making.
Moll et al. (2006) showed that donating money to a charity
recruited the mesolimbic reward system in a similar way as
whenmonetary rewards were obtained. Izuma et al. (2009) found
high ventral striatal activations when individuals made chari-
table donations in public. Tusche et al. (2016) identified disso-
ciable roles of anterior insula and temporoparietal junction for
affective empathy and cognitive perspective taking, respectively,
while relating these routes to intraindividual and interindividual
differences in altruistic behaviour.
Regions across the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have
recently moved into the focus of studies comparing the pro-
cessing of reward for self vs other as well as foraging processing
in general. However, ACC consists of several subregions and
previous research showed that there is more than one signal
coming from ACC, and that some of the signals may arise from
these different subregions. Using computational modelling and
functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) in a reward learning task,
Lockwood et al. (2016) showed that the subgenual anterior cin-
gulate cortex (sgACC) was associated with reward learning only
when individuals acted in a prosocial context, and this region
signals a prosocial prediction error. Moreover, individuals who
scored higher in trait empathy were faster in learning to benefit
others, and they exhibited a sgACC response that was more
selective for prosocial learning. Consistent with the growing
focus on the ACC, Apps et al. (2016) presented a model based
on vicarious motivation and error processing whereby a specific
region of ACC gyrus (ACCg) is involved in costs, benefits and
errors during social interactions. Finally, ACC was also involved
in a neuroeconomics study that investigated the self and other
processing in the context of the ‘trust game’ (King-Casas et al.,
2005). When participants made investment decisions as the
investor (self-phase) and when they played the trustee role
and observed the investors’ decisions (other-phase), there was
elevated activation in mid-cingulate cortex (MCC) and ACC,
respectively. In addition, dorsal regions of ACC have been
implicated in foraging contexts in both humans (Kolling et al.,
2012) and primates (Hayden et al. 2011), though the nature of
this role (i.e. the computations that take place during foraging)
remains under debate (Shenhav et al., 2014, 2016a, 2016b; Kolling
et al., 2016). Given this wide body of work, we predict that ACC
should be involved in personal and social foraging processing.
To understand the aforementioned distinction between
social and personal foraging behaviour, it is imperative to
also consider the role of individual differences. Personal value
orientation is an individual difference variable that possesses
a particularly close conceptual connection to this self–other
distinction. Value orientations are defined as ‘the principles or
standards of behaviour, one’s judgement of what is important
in life’ (Soanes and Stevenson, 2003). These orientations are
frequently measured utilising Schwartz’s (1992, Schwartz et al.,
2012) Circumplex Model of Values, which has been validated in
over 80 nations and has been subjected to diverse experimental,
longitudinal and cross-sectional tests (Maio, 2010). The model
posits the existence of 10 types of human values (Figure 1),
with each expressing specific motives organised according to
their motivational conflicts and compatibilities. Of particular
relevance for our interests is the contrast between values with
a personal vs a social focus (Schwartz et al., 2012). The personal
end of the dimension features values promoting power, achieve-
ment, stimulation, hedonism, self-direction and security. In
contrast, the social end features values promoting benevolence,
universalism, tradition, conformity and security. Of particular
relevance here is the contrast between self-focused values and
social-focused values in this model (Schwartz et al., 2012). The
self-focus dimension comprises the egocentric human values of
self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and
security. Conversely, the social-focus dimension incorporates a
high regard for social norms (tradition, conformity, security) and
well-being of others (benevolence, universalism).
Individuals with a personal focus are more concerned with
outcomes for self, whereas those with a social focus are con-
cerned with outcomes for others or for established institutions
(Schwartz et al., 2012). To this end, this personal vs social
distinction in values should be pivotal in how people construe
personal (foraging for oneself, see below) vs social (foraging on
behalf of others) foraging tasks. While personal foraging should
be influenced by how people assign reward value to choices
that have varying degrees of personal costs and benefits, social
foraging behaviour (foraging for others) should be influenced by
how people assign reward value to choices that have varying
degrees of costs and benefits for others. Previous studies have
demonstrated individual variation in foraging behaviour for
the self (Kolling et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2014; Constantino
and Daw, 2015), but have provided little information on
motivational determinants of this variation. Based on previous
findings in prosociality and classical economic decision-making
(Brosch et al., 2011; Lockwood et al., 2017), we would expect
self-focused individuals to attempt to gather more money for
themselves (personal foraging) than for charity (social foraging).
However, it is less clear whether a self-focused individual would
actually obtain more reward during personal foraging than a
social-focused person.
We thus designed two experiments that would enable us to
address these issues. In both experiments, participants alter-
nated between foraging for themselves and foraging for a charity
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Fig. 1. The circumplex structure of human values (modified from Schwartz, 1992). Self-focused individuals score high on the value types self-direction, stimulation,
hedonism, achievement, power and security, while the social-focused individuals score high on universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security.
of their choice. In Experiment 1, participants decided whether
to engage with a given choice of options or to keep looking
for better options (foraging). When they chose to engage with
a given option, they were asked to make a classical economic
decision between two outcomeswith known rewardmagnitudes
and probabilities. In Experiment 2, participants were presented
with a video simulation of apple harvesting. They were shown
an image of an apple tree and had to decide whether to harvest
it for apples and incur a short harvest delay, or move to a new
tree and incur a longer travel delay. The design of Experiment
1 crucially involved two distinct modes of decision-making,
and thus allowed us to address the influence of human values
on foraging and classical economic decision-making separately.
The design of Experiment 2, with its traditional patch depletion
environment, includes only the foraging stage (equivalent to
Stage 1 of Experiment 1, which takes cross-sections through
the traditional patch-depletion environment on each trial). This
design was used to test whether similar patterns of behaviour
are obtained in a foraging design directly related to the classical
animal foraging literature (e.g. Charnov, 1976; Stephens and
Krebs, 1986). At the behavioural level, we predict in both Exp 1
and Exp 2 that self-focused individuals should attempt to gather
more money for themselves (personal foraging) than for charity
(social foraging). Unlike Exp 2, Exp 1 was an fMRI study. With
respect to the imaging hypotheses, as noted before given the
relevance of ACC in the self vs other processing togetherwith evi-
dence of foraging computations within the ACC in both humans
(Kolling et al., 2012) and primates (Hayde et al., 2011), we predict
that ACC should be involved in personal and social foraging
processing.
Materials and methods
Participants
Thirty undergraduate and post-graduate university students
between 18 and 37 years of age (9 males) took part in the
study. Participants were informed that the study investigates
the neural (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiments 1 and 2,
instructions of which can be seen in Supplementary Information
1)mechanisms of foraging behaviour. All participants completed
Experiment 1 before Experiment 2. For the behavioural analysis
in Experiment 1, three participants were excluded because of
incomplete scanning sessions, and one participantwas excluded
because she foraged fewer than seven times (i.e. only once)
during social foraging (7, exclusion criterion). Seven additional
participants were excluded from the neuroimaging analysis in
Experiment 1 because of excessive motion; that is, at least a
single image exceeded 2 mm during realignment within a single
run. In Experiment 2, one participant was excluded because of
excessive time outs (i.e. more than three standard deviations
above the mean). Overall, 25 participants were included for the
behavioural analysis across both experiments, and 18 subjects
were included for the fMRI analysis in Experiment 1. The study
was approved by the Cardiff University School of Psychology
ethics committee, and all participants gave written informed
consent.
Experimental design
Charity selection. Participants were informed during the instruc-
tion phase (for full instructions, see Supplementary Informa-
tion 2) that the number of points (Experiment 1) or apples
(Experiment 2) would be converted into real money at the end
of the experiment and that the reward obtained during personal
foraging would be paid to them (on top of the fixed participation
payment of £15 in Experiment 1 and £6 in Experiment 2), while
the reward obtained during social foraging would be given to
the charity. Participants were then asked to select the charity of
their choice from a list including the following charities: British
Red Cross, Save the Children Fund, Oxfam, The Salvation Army,
Cancer Research UK and Macmillan Cancer Support. Partici-
pants were free to choose different charities in the two exper-
iments. The behavioural data in Experiment 1, but not those in
Experiment 2, were obtained inside the fMRI scanner.
Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, participants performed a two-
stage decision-making task (Kolling et al., 2012; Shenhav et al.,
2014, Figure 2, Panel A). In Stage 1, participants decided whether
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Fig. 2. Graphical depictions of a trial in Experiment 1 (Panel A, adapted from Shenhav et al., 2014) and Experiment 2 (Panel B, adapted from Constantino and Daw, 2015).
to engage with a given choice of options or to keep looking
for better options (foraging). In Stage 2, participants made a
classical economic decision between two outcomes with known
reward magnitudes and probabilities. On each trial in Stage 1
(upper panels, Figure 2A), participants were offered a pair of
potential rewards (large numbers). They could choose to forage
for a better pair of rewards from the set shown at the top of
the screen (smaller numbers in the red box), in which case a
random pair from that set was swapped with the current offer.
Participants who made this choice would incur a forage cost
(shown on the left, below the red box) and a delay until the
new choice was shown. Participants could forage any number
of times (or not at all) before opting to proceed to Stage 2 (lower
panel). After they entered Stage 2, a probability was randomly
assigned to each of the reward options (height of violet bar
beside each number) and participants were prompted to choose
one of themagnitude-probability pairs. Participants received the
outcome of the gamble on each Stage 2 trial, and these were
displayed as accumulating points at the bottom of the screen
(not shown).
Participants completed a total of eight fMRI runs (four per-
sonal foraging, four social foraging). Before each of the eight
blocks, a short message on the screen told participants whether
the forthcoming block was personal or social. Participants expe-
rienced the foraging conditions in one of two orders: (1) per-
sonal, social, personal, social, social, personal, personal, social
or (2) social, personal, social, personal, personal, social, social,
personal. A block typically lasted for 11 min.
The analysis of the behavioural data of Experiment 1 focused
on the reward during (1) personal foraging (i.e. the total number
of points obtained for self during the four personal foraging
runs), (2) social foraging (i.e. the total number of points given
to the charity during the four social foraging runs) and (3) the
difference of the two (i.e. the reward obtained for self minus the
reward given to the charity).
Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, participants completed an
adapted version of a virtual patch-foraging task (Figure 2B; 2).
Each run consisted of approximately 50 trials. Participants
foraged (Figure 2B) for apples in four 14-min (i.e. 7 m Personal
Foraging, 7 m Social Foraging) virtual patch-foraging orchards
(i.e. Long-Shallow, Long-Steep, Short-Shallow, Short-Steep). The
recipient of reward (i.e. self, charity) was signalled with a letter
(‘S’, self, or ‘O’, other) that was presented throughout each block
(not shown in the figure).
On each trial, participants were presented with a tree and
had to decide whether to harvest it for apples and incur a short
harvest delay, or move to a new tree and incur a longer travel
delay. Harvests at a tree earned apples, albeit at an exponentially
decelerating rate. Similar to Constantino and Daw’s study (2),
we varied the quality of the foraging context by manipulating
two environmental parameters: depletion rate and travel time.
The depletion rate determines the rate at which earned apples
decrease with subsequent harvest decisions at a given tree. It is
a fixed multiplicative decay κ, such that if a participant harvests
eight apples in the current trial, the number of apples to be
harvested in the next trial will be the depletion rate multiplied
by 8. Bymanipulating the depletion rate,we created one environ-
ment with fast depletion (steep) and one with slower depletion
(shallow). Additionally, we created two more types of orchards—
long (9 s) and short (6 s)— by manipulating the travel time, the
time it takes to travel to a new tree. Combining these twomanip-
ulations resulted in the four orchard-types that participants
visited during the task: Long-Shallow, Long-Steep, Short-Shallow
and Short-Steep. Apart from the depletion rate and travel time,
all of the other environment parameters remained the same
across orchards (Supplementary Information 2).
New trees were drawn from a Gaussian distribution and
the environmental richness or opportunity cost of time was
varied across blocks by changing the travel time and/or the apple
depletion rate (see below). The quality of the tree, depletion
rate and richness of the environment were a priori unknown to
the subject. The aim of the participants was to maximize their
reward (i.e. number of apples) for themselves or for a charity of
their choice, depending on their experimental condition. Similar
to Experiment 1, this was a within-subject design.
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Participants foraged in each orchard for 14 min (7 min per-
sonal and 7 min for social foraging). Similar to Experiment 1,
Experiment 2 focused on the reward during (1) personal foraging
(i.e. the total number of apples obtained for self during the
personal foraging), (2) social foraging (i.e. the total number of
apples given to the charity during the social foraging) and (3) the
difference of the two (i.e. the reward obtained for self minus the
reward given to the charity). In addition to the reward,we looked
at individual exit thresholds, defined as the mean number of
apples atwhich the participants choose to switch to a new tree in
each of the environment types. This was calculated by averaging
the number of apples at exit across trees in a given orchard.
For example, an exit threshold of 9 means that participants
tended to leave a tree when the last harvest yielded 9 apples.
Each orchard has an optimal, average reward-maximizing exit
threshold given by the Marginal Value Theorem (Charnov, 1976).
A higher than optimal empirical exit threshold signals under-
harvesting bias (i.e. leaving trees too early), while one that falls
below the optimal threshold signals an overharvesting bias (i.e.
staying with trees too long). For the purposes of this study, we
calculated the exit threshold separately for personal and social
foraging.
MRI data acquisition
All MRI Data were acquired at the Cardiff University Brain
Research Imaging Centre on a 3 T GE SignaHDx system (General
Electric, Milwaukee, USA) equipped with an 8HR Brain parallel
head coil for radio frequency transmission/reception.
Structural MRI. Anatomical high-resolution T1-weighted vol-
ume scans (1 mm3) were acquired using a fast spoiled gradient
echo (FSPGR) 3-D sequence (repetition time (TR) = 7.849 ms;
echo time (TE) = 2.984 ms; field of view = 256 × 256 mm; voxel
size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm).
Functional MRI. Functional images were acquired with a
gradient-echo EPI sequence (TR 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle
87◦, gap = 1 mm, number of slices = 43, voxel dimension =
3.5 × 3.5 × 4.4, tilted 15◦ relative to the AC/PC plane).
MRI data pre-processing
Imaging data were analyzed in SPM8 (Wellcome Department
of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK).
Functional volumes were motion corrected, normalized to a
standardized (MNI) template (including resampling to 2-mm
isotropic voxels), spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel
(8-mm FWHM) and high-pass filtered (0.01-Hz cut-off). Separate
regressors were included for the Stage 1 and Stage 2 decision
phases. These regressors were all modelled as stick functions
(which sets the duration of events to 0 and the event is modelled
using a canonical hemodynamic response function). The main
analyses probed the difference between personal and social (i.e.
contrast self minus charity conditions) in two independent anal-
ysis one during foraging (Stage 1) and the other during classical
economic decision-making (Stage 2). The GLM#1 featured the
two main predictors (Stage 1, foraging and Stage 2, classical
economic decision-making) but additionally included separate
parametric regressors. Stage 1 featured three parametric regres-
sors: (i) task difficulty (defined as the negative absolute value of
the log-odds of choosing to forage vs engage on each trial based
on the choice values), (ii) search evidence and (iii) search cost (i.e.
the amount of points the participant will deterministically lose
if they choose to forage), while Stage 2 featured one paramet-
ric regressor, relative value (i.e. the difference between reward
magnitude of the left option * reward probability of the left
option and the reward magnitude of right option * reward prob-
ability of the right option). The parametric modulators were
standardized (i.e. z-scored) at the subject level before they were
entered into the General Linear Model (GLM) and we disabled
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM’s) default orthogonalization
option which sequentially orthogonalizes the regressors in a
hierarchical fashion during the first-level analysis. All analysis
presented below refer to GLM#1 apart from the Supplementary
Information 6 (where we used GLM#2 which was identical to
GLM#1 but did not feature any parametric modulators). The
cluster-level results were obtained using both SPM’s random
field theory and the toolbox Statistical Non-Parametric Mapping
(SnPM, see Supplementary Information 3) within SPM8. SnPM
uses the GLM to construct pseudo t-statistic images, which are
then assessed for significance using a standard non-parametric
multiple comparisons procedure based on randomisation/per-
mutation testing. All results presented below involve clusters
that survived Family Wise Error (FWE)-cluster level correction at
an initial uncorrected voxel-wise P-value cluster forming thresh-
old of 0.001. Our approach is consistent with current guidelines
on the reporting of whole-brain MRI data (Roiser et al., 2016).
Human values
Participants completed the Schwartz value survey (SVS;
Schwartz, 1992), a 56-item scale that can be used to measure
the value types shown in Supplementary Information 1.
Participants were asked to rate the importance of each of
the 56 values as a guiding principle in their lives, using a
quasi-bipolar 9-point scale ranging from −1 (opposed to my
values), 0 (not important), 4 (important) to 7 (of supreme
importance). Examples of SVS items are as follows: ‘Equality:
Equal opportunity for all’ (Universalism); ‘Pleasure: Gratification
of desires’ (Hedonism); ‘Obedient: Dutiful meeting obligations’
(Conformity). The average score across the 56 items was
calculated and subtracted from each of the 56 initial raw scores,
prior to calculating the average of the value scores within each
of the 10 value types. Schwartz recommends this procedure to
help control for superfluous individual variations in rating styles
(Schwartz, 1992). To create the self-focus score, we calculated
the average score on self-direction, stimulation, hedonism,
achievement, power and security values. To calculate the social-
focus score and we calculated the average score of universalism,
benevolence, tradition, conformity and security values.
Results
Behavioural parameters
Wefirst testedwhether we replicated the behavioural findings of
the original studies (Shenhav et al., 2014; Constantino and Daw,
2015). In Exp 1 we replicated the overall tendency (Kolling et al.
2012, Shenhav et al., 2014) of individuals to show an engage vs
forage bias during Stage 1, which was consistent in both the
personal (P < 0.05) and social (P < 0.05) foraging. Similarly, we
replicated the main exit threshold findings in Exp 2. Namely,
in the short vs long travel time orchards participants showed a
higher exit threshold (P < 0.05). Similarly, in the shallow vs steep
orchards, participants showed a higher exit threshold (P < 0.05).
Importantly, these patterns were also replicated significantly in
the self and other conditions separately. Having thus replicated
the behavioural effects of the original studies, we proceeded to
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Figure 3. Scatterplots depicting the associations betweenhuman-value orientation and overall reward obtained during personal and social foraging (across Experiment 1
and Experiment 2). These depict a positive association between self-focused values and overall reward during personal (Panel A) but not social (Panel B) foraging for
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 combined (Panel A).
Table 1. Correlations between the social values and foraging indices
SE ST CO OP Self-Focus Social-Focus
Total Number of Points Self (Exp1) r = 0.109 r = −0.314 r = −0.042 r = 0.442* r = 0.411* r = −0.249
Total Number of Points Other (Exp1) r = −0.290 r = 0.061 r = −0.007 r = 0.001 r = −0.134 r = 0.033
Total Number of Points Self-Other (Exp1) r = 297 r = −0.276 r = −0.025 r = 0.324 r = 0.402* r = 0.1207
Total Number of Points Self (Exp2) r s = 0.383* r s = −0.084 r s = −0.273 r s = 0.330 r s = 0.411* r s = 0.315
Total Number of Points Other (Exp2) r s = 0.141 r s = 0.202 r s = 0.357 r s = 0.131 r s = 0.164 r s = −0.148
Total Number of Points Self-Other (Exp2) r = 0.252 r = −0.355 r = 0.077 r = 0.156 r = 0.294 r = −0.137
investigate any behavioural differences between the personal
and social foraging conditions.
We then tested for any differences in specific behavioural
parameters in the paradigms, such as the overall reward earned,
number of foraging instances, exit threshold and reaction times
between personal vs social conditions. In Exp 1, we looked at the
following: (i) the Stage 1 intercept (the constant from the for-
aging binary logistic regression predicting foraging vs engaging
based on six continuous predictors the beta-weights of which
are plotted here, the higher engaging value, the lower engaging
value, highest foraging value, average foraging value, lowest for-
aging value, search cost); (ii) the Stage 2 intercept (the constant
from the classical economic decision-making; the binary logistic
regression predicted the left or right option, with beta-weights
for reward and probability); (iii) the number of overall points;
(iv) overall cost incurred; (v) number of overall forages; and (vi)
reaction times. In Exp 2, we looked at the following: (i) the
number of overall points; (ii) overall cost incurred; (iii) number of
overall forages; (iv) exit thresholds; and (v) reaction times.When
contrasting self vs other conditions, none of these behavioural
parameters was significant.
The effect of self-focus on the overall reward
We then tested whether self-focused individuals vs social-
focused individuals obtained more reward during the personal
conditions rather the social conditions. Participants who exhib-
ited a higher self-focus value orientation indeed earned higher
overall reward during personal foraging (across Experiments 1
and 2, adding the standardized overall reward in Experiment
1 and the equivalent in Experiment 2 into a single score)
r(23) = 0.529, P = 0.007 (pBONF = 0.014, given the two tests:
self and social focus); Figure 3A, but not during social foraging,
r(23) = 0.027, P = 0.898; Figure 3B. Indeed, these two correlations
were significantly different from each other, z-score = 2.077,
P = 0.038. Furthermore, the self-focus value orientation was
positively associated with the difference between overall reward
during personal and social foraging, r(23) = 0.455, P = 0.022.
For completeness, we conducted the same analysis sepa-
rately for Experiments 1 and 2, as well as correlating these
values with the second-level value dimensions that make up
the self-focus and social focus: self-enhancement (SE), self-
transcendence (ST), conservation (CO) and openness (OP) to
change (Table 1). Self-Focus was consistently and significantly
positively correlated with reward obtained for self in both Exp 1
and Exp 2.
Searching for potential behavioural mediators of the
effect of self-focus on the overall reward
After establishing a link between the self-focus score and the
overall reward we investigated whether this relationship is asso-
ciatedwith behaviouralmarkers of OP to Experience (i.e. number
of forages and the intercept of Stage 1 binary logistic regression
which reflects the overall tendency of the participant towards
foraging or engaging in Experiment 1 and the number of forages
or exit threshold in Experiment 2) or SE (i.e. higher reaction
time indicating more careful decisions), which are the two main
components constituting the self-focus score.We calculated the
difference in these markers (self–other conditions) and related
them to the difference in the corresponding overall reward (self–
other conditions), but found no significant association.
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Fig. 4. Less self-focused individuals showed greater activity in dACC for the self
condition relative to the other condition.
FMRI analysis: task difficulty and effects of condition
In order to validate our neural data against previous studies
(Shenhav et al., 2014, 2016b), we first performed whole-brain
analyses to test for correlates of foraging value and choice dif-
ficulty during the foraging stage of the task (Stage 1), collapsing
across the self and charity conditions. Replicating these pre-
vious findings, we find that a region of dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex (dACC) was robustly associated with the difficulty
of a foraging choice (Supplementary Information 4; peak MNI
coordinates: x = 6 y = 22 z = 50, t = 8.35; k = 640, cluster-
corrected pFWE = 0.006). Having provided this initial validation,
we next tested for regions that differentiated between the self
and charity condition, either during foraging (Stage 1) or clas-
sical economic decision-making (Stage 2). Consistent with our
behavioural null results, no brain region was differentially active
for the other vs self condition, either in Stage 1 or Stage 2.
FMRI analysis: effects of self-focus
Given our finding that the self-focus is correlated with the
amount of reward obtained during the personal vs social
conditions, we next tested whether this value orientation is
associated with neural activity during the personal foraging
relative to social foraging. We found that self-focus was indeed
negatively related to the contrast of average neural activity
during self vs other trials, in a cluster encompassing dACC and
more central regions of the MCC (x = 2 y = 8 z = 38, k = 624;
P = 0.011; Figure 4, (see a bar plot of the raw beta-weights and
correlations between the raw beta weights and the self-focus
score in the Supplementary Information 5). Individual variation
in the beta-weights of this dACC/MCC cluster was negatively
associated with the amount of money obtained for oneself
compared to that gained for charity (r(16) = −0.512, P = 0.030),
whereas self-focus value orientation was not negatively related
to dACC/MCC activity to the same contrast during Stage 2 (even
when using small volume correction), and was not associated
with the amount of money obtained for self compared to the
charity. Lastly, we conducted a mediation analysis probing
whether the personal vs social activity within the ACC mediates
the relationship between the self-focus score and the self
vs other amount of reward, but this indirect effect was not
significant.
No brain region was found to be related to self-focus score
during Stage 2. However, four regions (middle temporal gyrus,
thalamus, post-central gyrus and precuneus) were engaged dur-
ing stage 2 in GLM#2 which featured no parametric predictors,
see Supplementary Information 6.
The aforementioned findings suggest that dACC/MCC acti-
vation is negatively related to the human value orientation
(i.e. self-focus value orientation) during foraging (Stage 1), but
not during classical economic decision-making (Stage 2), and
activity within this cluster is negatively related to the amount
of points obtained for oneself compared to charity. This region
was not, however, associated with the overall number of forages
taken, suggesting that effect of self-focus induced dACC engage-
ment on the overall reward is not underpinned by a general
propensity to forage vs engage.
Discussion. The present study investigated the effect of self-
focus on foraging behaviour by examining the role of human
value orientations in personal and social foraging behaviour
across two experiments. Two main results emerge from this
study. First, we demonstrated across two experiments, for the
first time, a direct association between one’s human value orien-
tation (in particular one’s degree of self-focus) and the amount
of reward earned when foraging for oneself rather than on
behalf of a charitable organization. Second, the self-focus score
was related to different brain regions depending on the type of
decision-making (dACC/MCC during foraging and middle tem-
poral gyrus, thalamus, post-central gyrus and precuneus during
classical economic decision-making), and individual variation of
dACC/
MCC in turn predicted the amount of reward obtained for oneself
compared to that given to the charity.
Human values have been previously associatedwith personal
(money obtained for self) and social (money given to a charity)
point allocations in classical economic decision-making in the
context of charitable donations (Brosch et al., 2011). Specifically,
they found that participants who cherished SE values kept more
money for themselves instead of donating it to charity. Here,
we extend these findings by showing that self-focused value
preferences have an effect on behaviour that extends beyond
the classical economic decision-making setting to the context
of foraging decisions. In particular, across both Experiments 1
and 2, therewas a positive association between a self-focus value
orientation and the number of points obtained during personal
foraging. Moreover, self-focus value orientation was positively
associated with the difference in money obtained during per-
sonal vs social foraging. This is the first demonstration of the
effect of human values on point allocation in a task involving
foraging computations.
Given the ubiquitous nature of foraging decisions in our daily
lives for ourselves and on behalf of others (and the foraging deci-
sions of other on behalf of us), understanding how self-focused
vs prosocial individuals differently value the welfare of others in
a foraging context may have a beneficial societal impact. From a
social psychological perspective, the effect of self-focused values
on foraging fits the nature of self-focused values. In particular,
self-focus has two main value components; (1) OP to Experience
and; (2) SE, each of which can be related to foraging behaviour in
a unique manner. The first value component, OP to Experience,
includes values that challenge the status quo (e.g. ‘creativity,’
‘curiosity’ and ‘freedom’), while the second value component,
SE, includes values that promote personal achievement (e.g.
‘wealth’, ‘success’ and ‘power’). In the case of the binary foraging
decision, the option to engagewith the currently available option
could be conceptualized as accepting the status-quo, while the
option to forage can be conceptualized as challenging the sta-
tus quo. Foraging is inherently about embracing the unknown,
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with risk but potentially high gains. These gains serve personal
achievement even more when the foraging is for the self. It
therefore makes sense that individual differences in values can
help to explain the substantial individual differences in foraging
behaviour.
However, close consideration of specific behavioural param-
eters in our experiments indicate that neither OP to Experience
nor SE orientations behavioural markers alone are sufficient
to explain the effects of self-focus. In Experiment 1 there are
two status-quo markers: the overall number of forages and the
intercept of Stage 1 binary logistic regression, which reflects the
overall tendency of the participant towards foraging or engaging.
However, there was no significant association between number
of forages or the overall tendency to forage and openness values
(or self-focus value orientation). In Experiment 2, the variable
reflecting status-quo is the harvest option, while the option to
travel to a new tree can be conceptualized as challenging the
status-quo. The behavioural measures reflecting the extent to
which participants are willing to challenge the status-quo are
the overall number of times they travel to a new tree, but this
variable was not significantly associated with OP to experience.
With regard to the role of SE, it could be argued that people with
high SE scores are likely to earn more money during personal
foraging because they spendmore time (i.e. higher reaction time)
trying to figure out the optimal choice during the personal vs
social foraging. However, the reaction time (i.e. personal forag-
ing reaction time minus social foraging reaction time) was not
related to the SE (or self-focus) scores in either Experiment 1 or
Experiment 2. Overall, then, other mechanisms must be invoked
to explain the association between self-focus value orientation
and foraging behaviour.
The neuroimaging data from Experiment 1 shed light on
this issue. Previous studies have found that dACC is positively
associated with the difficulty of a foraging choice (Shenhav et al.,
2014; Shenhav et al., 2016b), and that when controlling for choice
difficulty previously reported foraging value signals (Kolling et
al. 2012) are no longer observed in this region, a finding that was
replicated. Previous work found several signals in dACC within
foraging-like contexts. In particular, Wittmann et al., (2016) uti-
lized a reward-learning task where participants were asked to
engage or forage in a foraging-like patch based on its estimated
future value. They found that dACC predicted the positive effects
of recent and the negative effects of past rewards on choices.
Moreover, they found a graded transition from representation
of expected prediction errors to choice moving from posterior
to more anterior dACC into the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC). Here, we show that dACC activity during foraging is
sensitive to an individual’s level of self-focus, even after control-
ling for task difficulty. Moreover, activation of the dACC during
foraging negatively predicted the overall earnings obtained for
oneself vs the charity. Taken together, our behavioural and imag-
ing findings suggest that more efficient personal foraging and
more prominent self-focus was associated with reduced dACC
activity.
Beyond these signals that have been observed in dACC
within foraging-like contexts the dACC has been implicated
in tracking many other signals including potential reward,
punishment, errors, surprise effort-reward-trade-off, updating
of beliefs, internal models of the environment during learning
and the encoding aspects of choice value (the average value of
choices afforded by the environment and effort requirements)
(Rushworth et al., 2011; Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Shenhav et al.,
2013; Ullsperger et al., 2014; Klein-Flugge et al., 2016; Kolling et al.
2016; Alexander et al., 2017).Taken these findings together,
leading researchers to propose a variety of integrative theories
proposing that this region combines these varied signals in order
to adaptively adjust behaviour, internal models and/or cognitive
control states (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Rushworth et al., 2012;
Shenhav et al., 2013; Kolling et al., 2016; Shenhav et al., 2016a).
Generalizing from theories that posit a central role for dACC
in the monitoring and/or adjustment of cognitive control, we
speculate that self-focused individuals may be less impeded
by errors that are likely to occur in their decision-making and
thus operate more efficiently in scenarios of high motivational
salience (in this case, foraging for personal gain).
One potential limitation of the current study is the final
sample size (N = 18) of the imaging experiment compared to
the initial sample size (N = 30). The contrast between the self vs
other conditions did not yield any significant effect differences
in the current foraging experiments. Previous work investigating
self vs other behavioural differences suggested that there may
be differences in loss aversion (Mengarelli et al., 2014), in moral
decision-making (Crockett et al., 2014), in biases across atten-
tion and perception and for charitable decision-making (cited
in Sui and Gu, 2017). These prior findings suggest that indi-
viduals respond faster when making decisions for themselves
regardless of whether they are being selfish, the task is neutral
(Lockwood et al., 2015) or even if they are being hyper-altruistic
(Crockett et al., 2014). In our design, we did not find differences
in reaction time between self and other conditions. One poten-
tial contributing factor may be the sample size. However, as
discussed in the results section, we fully replicate the main
behavioural effects of the original studies. The relatively small
sample size may have more impact in the imaging analysis
where only 18 participants were included. We appreciate that
such a sample size is not optimal for individual differences and
mediation analysis. Replication and extension of the current
findings need to be investigated in larger sample sizes in future
work.
In sum, the present research (a) demonstrated a positive
association between the amount of reward obtain during the
personal conditions and the human value orientation of self-
focus and (b) suggests a novel role for the dACC in influencing
foraging behaviour outcomes in social scenarios and paves the
way for further studies into psychological and neural differences
influencing prosocial and egocentric behaviours.
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